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BOOK REVIEWS
Costigan's Cases on Wills. Third Edition. By JOSEPH WALTER BINGHAM.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company. 1941. Pp. XXIV, 948.
The publisher tells us that "For thirty years Costigan's Cases on Wills
has been one of the most widely used books in this field because of its many
commendable features and high scholarship." Those law teachers and law
students who have used Costigan's casebook will heartily endorse this tribute,
which has been so amply confirmed by their experience. "This new third
edition" is enthusiastically heralded by its publisher, because it "retains all
of the qualities which made the prior editions so popular with law instructors,
with the addition of modern cases, citations, and other material."
In the preface the editor tells us that this book does not pretend to solve
the problems which embarrass our law schools. It only offers some suggestions regarding them. Aside from the new cases, the chief additions are some
editorial comments and introductory notes. In the editor's opinion, "The
law of Decedents' Estates is socially too important, too technically complex,
and too extensive for slurring in law schools." To facilitate the attainment
of two objectives: the broadening and deepening of the training of law
students, and in the revising of their curricula, this third edition presents
a rearrangement of materials widely different from that used in prior editions.
To stimulate the student to do work in the library, the third edition often
raises unanswered queries.
In the third edition, Part I is devoted to Intestate Succession, Part II
to Wills and Testaments, and Part III to the Administration of Estates.
The rearrangement in Part II appears at first glance startlingly illogical.
Chapter 3, consisting of six sections, treats of Infancy, Coverture, Alienage,
Convicton of Crime, Mental Capacity and Probate Jurisdiction. Under
the disabilities which preclude the act of testation, one would scarcely expect
to find Probate Jurisdiction classified. The editor includes under that category,
however, Testamentary Intent, Fraud, Mistake and Undue Influence. Of
course Probate Jurisdiction would seem to have no more to do with the
materials so included than it has to do with the materials which relate to
testatorial disability. This admixture also associates the materials dealing
with the conclusiveness of probate of realty as opposed to personalty, the
kinds of probate, and the probate of lost and newly discovered wills. The
editor's justification for the arrangement seems to be that "Throughout
the study of the topics of fraud, mistake, undue influence, and the construction of wills, clear understanding requires a constant distinguishing of the
primary probate matters from other associated matters which are controlled
by different technical considerations."
If it is startling to find that the materials dealing with Probate Jurisdiction
follow the topic of testatorial disabilities and are correlated with fraud,
mistake and undue influence, it prepares one for the shock when one discovers
that the Classification of Legacies and Devises, involving problems of
abatement and ademption, are dealt with in Chapter 4, which follows
Testamentary Capacity and Intent (Chap. 3) but precedes the Due Execution
148

1941]

BOOK REVIEWS

of Wills, which is dealt with in Chapter 6. The chapter on Integration and
Incorporation (Chap. 5) precedes the chapter on Due Execution of Wills,
which treatment requires the editor to explain that the latter is "the basis
of the technical difficulties presented" in the former. Costigan presented
these materials in the reverse order.
The editor justifies the inclusion of the classification of legacies and devises
under Construction of Wills because "as a mechanical aid in the study of
the material of this section, the traditional classification of legacies and
devises will be useful. The problems of the section are problems of construction, athough text writers have not aways thus characterized them."
Some may be a bit puzzled by the arrangement. Problems of construction
permeate every chapter of the book. Words are the stuff of which wills
as well as law are made; wherever words are used, there problems of
construction arise. Since the words of the will are the symbols of a specific
testator-not of testators in general-the problems of construction are
accentuated. "What is the end of a will ?" has been in the realm of statutory
construction for over a hundred years. Indeed, it will remain there as long
as the statute endures. Still, by way of classification, the dominant significance of signing "at the end" in orienting a student in the subject of
wills is formal rather than substantial; primarily it arises as a problem of
execution rather than construction. Perhaps one should not dogmatically
insist that as a mechanical aid some other classification may not prove to be
more helpful. Experiment is the only satisfactory test which will supply
the answer. Of course, if the instructor is not impressed with the editor's
arrangement of materials he is always at liberty to change it, by assignment,
according to his own ideas of convenience, or according to his idiosyncracies,
as the case may be.
The editor declares that "In spite of changes, this book is still Costigan
on Wills and not the present editor's invention." English cases still abound,
due in part at least to the preservation of Costigan's materials.
Herbert D. Laube*
It aca, New York
Cases and Materials on Taxation. By PAUL W.
Publishing Company. 1941. Pp. xxiv, 1228.

BRUTON.

St. Paul: West

If Professor Bruton is not a descendant of Henry Clay's, he surely
deserves to be; for this book is essentially a compromise, and a good one.
That is both its merit and its fault. In trying to please all, it may succeed
in fully pleasing none.
The anguished cries of taxpayers bowed under redoubled loads have
awakened the law schools to the importance of taxation in our present
design for living. The demands of the defense program point to its significance for the future. Even schools which were chugging comfortably
along on pre-1914 curricula are now adding new courses in taxation. And
new courses call for new casebooks.
*Professor of Law, Cornell

University.
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One answer to the demand was to put out new editions of old casebooks.
But no matter how skillful the face-lifting, it was superficial. The basic
troubles remained. Existing casebooks on taxation, originally put together
by the every-little-bit-added-to-what-you've-got method, usually contained
something on property taxes, something on estate, gift, and income taxes,
and some cast-off problems from constitutional law and conflict of laws.
Supposed general principles were illustrated by a jumble of state and
federal cases, poorly tied to statutes and regulations. The result was a
course which some,1 at least, found difficult to teach.
The rebels against the traditional taxation casebook took a different
approach. "The importance of the states," they said, "is dwindling, while
that of the Federal Government grows. The important taxes today are
federal taxes: state taxes are coming to follow the federal model. Therefore
we will devote our time to federal taxes. By doing so, we shall be able to
study a complete tax system-the integration of statute, cases, and regulations-which we could not do if we were compelled to consider the law
of forty-eight states. In consequence, we shall find that unifying concept
which courses in taxation hitherto have lacked." This approach resulted
in Professor Griswold's excellent casebook, 2 and in the steadily improving
federal tax courses offered by the publishers of the looseleaf services.
Professor Bruton's casebook attempts to find a middle ground. "The
book includes about 250 cases, ... but obviously it cannot all be covered
in any one course. It is designed for use in courses of differing types... In
a field which is developing as rapidly as taxation, .

.

. the courses given

will differ considerably ...Such a situation justifies a larger casebook...,,3
Accordingly, the book contains several improvements upon the traditional
taxation casebook, but still clings largely to the traditional form.
The'constitutional law of taxation is segregated in Part 1, the first third
of the book. Part 2 deals with tax law in operation. This arrangement is
convenient, both for the instructor who wishes to concentrate upon constitutional problems and for the instructor who wishes to slight them.
Interred in Part 1,4 for example, are the Pollock case, 5 Knowlton v. Moore,6
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co.,7 and Bronley v. McCaughn.8 There
are minor puzzles in Part 1-such as the relegating of the decisions under
the Social Security Act to a footnote,9 and the omission of Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes's dissent in Graves v. Elliatt'°-but on the whole it seems
a thoroughly competent job.
Although I have more fault to find with Part 2, in several ways I think
'See,
for example, GRIswoLD,
2

CASES ON FFDERAL

TAXATiOx (1940) Preface, p. v.

Supra note 1.

8Preface, p. x.

4
At
5

pp. 259-293.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895).
6178 U. S. 41 (1900).
7240 U. S. 1 (1916).
8280 U. S. 124 (1929).
9
See p. 66, n. 25.
'OSee pp. 139-149, and n. 27, p. 149.
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it improves upon the traditional casebook. Introductory notes' l at the
beginning of the sections on income, estate, and gift taxes not only outline
the history of the tax, but deal briefly with how the tax works-its computation. The note on the income tax contains a specimen individual income3
tax return. 12 There is an attempt to treat such practical matters as valuation,'
15
and the "reenactment rule."'14 There is some use of administrative rulings.
The greatest improvement, I think, is that the size of the book and the
separate treatment of constitutional problems make it possible, in Part 2,
to devote more space to tax laws in operation, and to those taxes which
today are growing more important. A comparison with the third edition
of Magill and Maguire's Cases on Taxation,'0 a casebook of the traditional
type, illustrates the point. At the same time, a comparison with Griswold's
Cases on Federal Taxation,17 a casebook of the newer type, may be of
interest.'3

Subject
Constitutional law
Property taxes
Death and gift taxes
Income taxes
Tax administration
Federal tax procedure

Bruton
410 pp.
156 pp.
206 pp.
364 pp.
81 pp.
0 pp.

Magill
414 pp.
164 pp.
156 pp.
239 pp.
80 pp.
0 pp.

Griswold
80 pp.
0 p2.
189 pp.
296 pp.
76 pp.
37 pp.

Comparison of the Bruton and Griswold books brings out what to me
is the greatest fault of the Bruton book-its failure to go far enough:
Because it must deal with state cases as well as with federal, there is not
space to treat the federal material with the fullness it deserves. Professor
Griswold, by devoting his attention entirely to the federal tax system, has
been able to treat more problems of tax administration in 739 pages than
has Professor Bruton in 1217 pages. Even in the income tax field, where
Professor Bruton has confined himself wholly to federal cases, I find
no mention of such practically important matters as accruals to date of
death, wash sales, personal holding companies, intercorporate dividends,
improper accumulation of surplus, inventories, or the installment and longterm contract methods of accounting-all of which are taken up in Professor
Griswold's book. Deductions for charitable contributions are treated only
in a footnote.19 The income tax treatment of life insurance-a subject to
which Mr. Paul has devoted part of a lengthy essay 2Q-is likewise dismissed
in a footnote. 2'
a1Pp. 567-571; 593-4; 773-780.
:2p. 778.
13
For example, pp. 715 et seq.
' 4 pp. 1150-1160.
5
'10For example, pp. 816-817.
Foundation Press, 1940.
187Supra note 1.

' These figures are my own compilation and are only approximately accurate.
19P. 975, n. 96.
2
OPaul, Life Insuratwe, Annuities, antd the Inoome Tax, STuDiEs IN FEDE.RA TAxATIOrN (Third Series, 1940) 351, at pp. 353-369, 403-418.
21p. 804, n. 34. In the accompanying text, Professor Bruton quotes the present provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
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Professor Bruton has inserted lengthy quotations from texts, from law
reviews, and from the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations under it.
I doubt the wisdom of this policy. In view of the general availability of
this material in most libraries, I should think he might better have omitted
it and devoted the space saved to discussion and expanded treatment of
matters he has had to omit or condense.
There are other minor criticisms. I have difficulty in following the
organization of the income tax section of the book. I can't understand why
Professor Bruton has included the old reorganization cases, 22 and the present
statute, 23 " but none of the modern cases.2 4 The addition of some material
on federal tax procedure would help to bring courses taught from the
book down to earth. So would More liberal use of administrative rulings
and decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals. There are not enough problem
notes: more of them would make the book more provocative and stimulating,
and cure a slight apparent tenddncy toward spoon feeding. The table of
cases and the index are not complete enough to suit me.
This, of course, is quibbling, and- in fairness to Professor Bruton it should
be taken with raised eyebrows. I have not used his book in the classroom
and so I cannot do full justice to it here. Beyond question, Professor
Bruton has done a thorough and painstaking job, and produced a good
asebook, of its sort. My quarrel is not with the book, but with the class to
Which it belongs. I have come to believe that a taxation course, and therefore
a taxation casebook, must be tied firmly to statute and administrative
r-ulings, and that consequently it may profitably treat the federal tax system
alone, and perhaps the tax system of a single state alone, but not a confused
mass of decisions from everywhere floating formlessly in space. Professor
Bruton's book has come a little way froin the taxation casebook of tradition,
but to my mind it has not come far enough.
Daniel G. Yorkey*
Ithaca, New York

Constitutional Revolution,,Ltd.

By EDWARD

S. CoRWIN.

Claremont:

Claremont Colleges. 1941. Pp. xi, 121.
This little volume consists of three brilliant lectures-penetrating, concise,
witty-on the causes, nature, and scope of the recent and continuing
revolution in our constitutional law. It should be of special interest to
readers of Professor Corwin's earlier Twilight of the Supreme Court to
which it is a welcome supplement, but it deserves wide reading on its own
account.
22pp. 852-864.

23pp. 911-917.
24
For example, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935); United States v.
Hendler, 303 U. S. 564 (1938) ; Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U. S. 415 (1940). It seems
to me that the reorganization provisions of the Code alone are not of much value to
the student, and that he should have the accompanying gloss of at least the landmark
decisions construing them.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University.
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Most important questions of public policy in our government must be
solved not only on their merits but also in terms of legality. The "good"
is often uncertain. So to, unhappily, is the constitutional. It may be the
duty of the Court merely "to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former." But on the meaning of the Constitution
opinions are diverse, so that behind the forms of adjudication, courts, in
fact, have often legislated." Mr. Justice Harlan once remarked that "if
we don't like an act of Congress, we don't have much trouble to find
grounds for declaring it unconstitutional." The substantial truth in this
observation is amply demonstrated by Professor Corwin. In his first chapter
he sketches the Supreme Court's vague doctrines and frequently contradictory
precedents which "can be brought to the support of widely divergent conceptions of governmental function, depending on the point of view of the
Justices." The most important of these dualisms in recent years have been
developed around the due process clause and the commerce clause, which
he treated more fully a few years ago in his convincing Commerce Power
versus States' Rights.
The Roosevelt Administration began its judicial career at a time when
the Supreme Court was dominated by doctrines which supported economic
laissez-faire. Still, the Court's "stock in trade" contained precedents on
which the New Deal could have been sustained had the Justices exercised
their "sovereign prerogative of choice" for that purpose. The results of
their temporary failure to do so are familiar. Mr. Corwin summarizes,
appraises, and finds somewhat wanting the reasoning of the majority in
the Schechter, Butler, and Carter cases. But in the labor board, social
security, and subsequent decisions our constitutional law has been revolutionized. The President of the American Bar Association in 1939 lamented
that the Court had "liquidated... what had long been looked on as 'established' principles of constitutional law... And there was no subtlety about it."
But Solicitor General Jackson saw in the transformation "a constitutional
Renaissance... a rediscovery of the Constitution." Even more interesting
is the fact that the process was begun by the old Court. True, the conservative quadumvirate remained generally unmoved, and credit or blame
for the change must be given largely to Mr. Justice Roberts, "another Saul
at another Tarsus." Professor Corwin attributes the shift partly to the
threat of the Court reorganization proposal (about which he says little),
but is inclined to attach greater weight to the decisive victory of the New
Deal at the polls and to the serious labor disputes of 1936-1937. Moreover, deep inroads had been made into the ideology of laissez-faire jurisprudence by economic developments, extra-judicial criticism, and vigorous
dissents from the bench. Since 1937 new blood with different vision has
carried the Court further in revision, "well bolstered," in Mr. Corwin's
opinion, "by applicable constitutional doctrine."
The chief consequence is that constitutional law has come closer to grips
with economic and political reality. The Court has given its approval-at
'For some charges and countercharges of judicial legislation in statutory construction at the last term of the Supreme Court see 85 L. Ed. 744, 770, 886, 912.
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least has removed its impediments-to more extensive and intensive government intervention into our nationalized economy by permitting the concentration of public power which seems inherent in contemporary industrial
society. Authority of the national government has been strengthened by
direct expansion and by cooperative federalism in which Washington is the
dominant senior partner; and executive authority has grown at the expense
of the legislature and the courts, particularly in administrative legislation
and adjudication. And the present Court seems inclined to further these
developments both by committing itself to doctrines favoring New Deal
legislation and by -practicing "self-abnegation."
So, judicial reconstruction rather than the difficult and uncertain procedure of formal amendment has to some extent readapted to modern
needs that Constitution which Marshall said was intended to endure for
ages to come. We have yet to devise adequate solutions for pressing
economic and social problems, but the task will be simpler with the removal
of certain legal obstacles to effective action. Not all will deplore the upshot,
but to those who do, Professor Corwin offers a parting consolation: "from
the most formidable of the dangers which today beset us the Supreme
Court could scarcely have shielded us even in the heyday of its power."
Elias Huzar*
Ithaca, New York

The Holmes-Pollock Letters. Edited by MARK DEWOLF HOWE. Harvard

University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1941. 2v., pp. xxii, 275, pp. 359.
It would be unfair to turn to the consideration of the contents of these
volumes without first paying high and richly merited tribute to the editor
whose painstaldng effort has made the publication of these letters possible,
and whose careful and detailed annotations make them understandable.
These volumes are indispensable to any library which seeks an adequate
presentation of the Anglo-American legal institutions during the past half
century. For Mr. Howe this must have been a labor of love. His close
association with Mr. Justice Holmes could not make it anything else. But
while there must have been both pleasure and satisfaction in the task, this
does not minimize the vast labor that went into the preparation of the
manuscript. Full credit, then, to Mr. Howe, who will have to forgive being:
forgotten once the reader has come under the fascinating spell of these
letters.
The editor, in his preface, proposes as a subtitle for this collection: "The
Autobiography of a Friendship; the Biography of an Era." The first
part of this title is, indeed, apt. Whether one agrees that the second part
is equally apt will depend upon the place which he accords these two men
in the events of their times. True it is that their interests were cosmopolitan,
and their correspondence ranges so widely that few things of social importance fail to receive mention. It is equally true that these two men,
*Instructor in Government, Cornell University.
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having marked differences of temperament, looked at 'these events from
opposite sides of the Atlantic, and held them up before somewhat different
backgrounds. But it can hardly be claimed for even this compendious
correspondence that it reflects all of the important thought of the times
with regard to social institutions.
This series of letters starts with a letter written, in July of 1874, by
Pollock to Holmes, who was then in England. It ends with a letter written
by Holmes, irl May of 1932. In so long a correspondence it is not surprising
that so many letters seem to be missing. The surprise is rather that so
many were preserved. And the fact that they seem to have been preserved
with some eye to future publication, to some degree relieves one from
the feeling that in reading them, he is snooping into purely private affairs.
Still, it is hard to harmonize the utter frankness of some of the statements
with a then existing plan to publish them later, for some of the comments
upon their contemporaries are acid and some almost waspish in their
sharpness. Be that as it may, this correspondence mirrors a most intimate
friendship, a friendship of the kind that does not enlist the aid of secretary
or stenographer. These letters were written in long hand, and this fact
presented a task of transcription which was far from easy and in which
the editor admits that he is not aways certain of the correctness of his
translation. As I put down the book, I wished that there had been not so
many of these adversely critical statements, and I wished that those which
were made had been made with less of positive assurance and not so great
an air of superiority. Perhaps I misread these statements, but I felt that
I would have charged lesser men with egotism. There were few instances
in which either man evidenced doubt of the correctness of his judgments
either of persons or of events.
It seems that in the beginning of the correspondence Pollock did a
somewhat better job of saving the letters than did Holmes, and Pollock
survived Holmes' death long enough to take a personal interest in the
present publication. It is impossible to place one's finger upon any single
aspect of this correspondence which may be said to be more interesting
than many others, but every reader must be struck by the manner in which
this friendship ripened and grew in warmth. This is marked by the content
of the letters as well as by the manner in which each addresses the other.
At first both were formal. The subject matter than was pretty legalistic,
and the addresses were: "My dear Mr. Holmes" and "My dear Pollock."
In 1902 Holmes was addressing Pollock as "Fred;" in 1904, "Dear Bart;"
and in 1914 as "My dear F.P." On his side, the limit of Pollock's unbending
seems to have been "My dear Holmes." From the rather definitely legal
matters their discussions broadened until their ambit included a surprisingly
wide array of topics in which they found a common interest. In one of
his letters to Pollock, Holmes says: "You do so many things that I never
know whether next to expect a drama, a law book, a symphony or a system
of philosophy." The letters which now and then were addressed to Lady
Pollock are not the least intriguing of the lot. It is probable that this
correspondence was kept alive in part by the relatively frequent contacts
when Pollock or Holmes visited the land of the other. Without this re-
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kindling of the fires of friendship the interchange could hardly have
continued for approximately sixty years. It would have waned and died
as did Holmes' correspondence with Leslie Stephen.
There is a strong temptation to present some of the striking statements
with which the letters bristle, and a great urge to discuss some of the views
presented in them. Second thought demonstrates the impossibility of doing
either. Any fair sampling within the confines of a book review is impossible.
A discussion of some of the views briefly stated in the letters would require
at least an essay, for which the present reviewer has neither the time nor
the ability required.
With some trepidation, I venture to give my impressions of these two
men as I emerge from the reading of this correspondence. They were
marked by great similarities of interest, and by equally great dissimilarities
of personality. Perhaps this explains the strength of their friendship.
Pollock seems to me to have been the better disciplined of the two, to have
had a more nearly unified philosophy and to have been somewhat more
tenacious of his ideas. Holmes seems to have been more influenced by
the sweep of changing events and to have been more sensitive to the
currents of new thought, and consciously so. In his letter of Sept. 23,
1902, when his nomination to the Supreme Court of the United States was
under consideration, after complaining that few had really understood him
and his motives, Holmes says: "If I haven't done my share in the way of
putting in new and remodeling old thought for the past 20 years, then I
delude myself." Holmes was on the side of the younger generation; whether
he sided with them or they with him is quite beside the point. Thus he
gained the reputation of being a consistent "liberal," and, as such, was
worshiped by many who forgot, or, perhaps, never recognized certain
inconsistent strains of conservatism displayed in some of his opinions.
Holmes was one of a small group who, to the lay mind, made dissenting
a virtue, and came to be honored more for the fact that they dissented
than for the reasons which they assigned as the basis of the dissents.
Possibly because of his English background, but more probably because
of his own make-up, Pollock is more consistent than Holmes, and much
less influenced by surges of opinion. He refuses to go along with ideas
that do not meet his standards, and by contemporary tests must be classed
as a "conservative." Pollock's formal contributions to legal scholarship
were many times greater than those of Holmes, and we find the latter
repeatedly complaining that the press of judicial labors had compelled
him to forego the preparation of some manuscript or other.
It seems to me that Holmes, like many another before him, has suffered
at the hands of his disciples, who in their ardor have not only distorted his
picture as an individual, but have done no little damage to the principles
which he had cherished. Such Americans as knew Pollock, knew him
through his writings. Pollock was the name of a man who wrote many
books, some of them running into numerous and unexplained editions.
These will remember that his prolific writings blanketed the fields of
Contracts, Torts and Jurisprudence; that is, the greater part of the law.
To most of his countrymen, Holmes, as indicated above, will be known as
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a liberal dissenter on a then reactionary court. Such half-knowledge is
deeply regrettable.
It seems probable that Pollock's interest in American law, American law
schools, and in our law reviews (unusual, we believe in a barrister of his
day) was largely inspired by Holmes. This interest was fed by the varied
series of lectures which Pollock from time to time gave in this country,
and was sustained by his contributions to these same law reviews. On the
other hand it is not unlikely that Holmes' recognition in England was
accelerated, if not largely induced, by Pollock. We defy any living person
to measure the value of the free-trade in ideas thus engendered.
The time is not yet ripe to measure the exact stature of these men,
or to estimate their joint and several effect upon our legal institutions.
That remains for a future generation which will have acquired a perspective
denied to contemporaries. It seems that beyond question that judgment
must be favorable, and that that generation, looking back to ours, must
also say, "There were giants in those days !"
It is not improbable that other readers will see these letters in a different
light than I have seen them. They have taken on different meanings as I
have reread some of them. I have no quarrel with him who differs from
me after reading them, but no person, knowing of these letters, should
be content wth his previous opinion of either of these men until he has
held that opinion up against the background of this correspondence. These
volumes are recommended reading or all who are interested in our evolving
social structure.
Lyman P. Wilson*
Ithaca, New Yor'k

Ocean Bills of Lading: the American and Canadian Law. 2d. ed. By
ARNOLD W. KNAUTHE.
Baltimore, Md.: American Maritime Cases, Inc.
Pp. 268.
This expansion of a work first issued in 1937 establishes that we have
in it the beginning of a classic, comparable to those English books which
run through edition after edition because they are indispensable. Knauth
records the movement for world uniformity in shipping documents which
led to the Hague Rules and to the International Convention for the Unification of Rules Relating to Ocean Bills of lading signed at Brussels in 1924.
He sets out the convention in the official French text and in English and
gives its recent history, showing the statutory enactments wherewith the
original adherent nations or subsequent adopting nations have implemented
the international agreement. Our own country had a prominent part in
this world movement. Our Harter Act of 1893 (reproduced at p. 230) is
evidence. The United States was an original signer at Brussels, and it
passed our Carriage of Goods by Sea Act-"COGSA"-in 1936 in conformity with the Convention. Beside our own "COGSA" (at p. 1) the
current volume reprints -the Canadian Water Carriage Act, 1936; the
*Professor of Law, Cornell University.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 27

Newfoundland "COGSA" of 1932; the Uniform North Atlantic Bill of
Lading; the Liverpool Cotton agreements, 1907-11; and other material.
All are complete texts. The book thus shows under what statutory and
contractual conditions present day overseas shipping is actually conducted
in normal times.
The subtitle states that the work is also "a historical statement, and a
commentary;" and by his labors under these headings Knauth makes
many men his debtors. The admiralty bar especially owes him thanks. But
every lawyer, and every business man whether shipper, shipowner or
financing banker, who deals with overseas trade will find in these pages
solid and reliable information on what has been accomplished in the effort
to achieve a bill of lading adapted to world use free of local variance in
phrasing and in legal treatment. Knauth's commentary on our Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act interrelates the statute to our older Harter Act, to our
Uniform and Federal Bills of Lading Acts, to our Interstate Corhmerce
Act. It then expounds the actual provisions of "COGSA," clause by clause,
using American legislation, judicial decisions and texts, supplemented by
the large foreign material at the author's command.
The author's equipment is high. As a practicing maritime lawyer in
New York City he has personal experience. As an editor of American
Maritime Cases and Secretary of the Maritime Association of the United
States, he has had opportunities for wide general information. He is the
editor of the recent seven volumes of Benedict's Admiralty. Such a background makes his book a "must have" for anyone concerned with the
subject matter.
G. H. Robinrson*
York
New
Ithaca,
Everyone's Children, Nobody's Child. By JUSTINE WIsE POLIER.
York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1941. Pp. xv, 331.

New

Perhaps the chief significance of Judge Polier's book is that the author is a
lawyer and a judge of a: children's court, and not a social worker. If more
judges dealing with juvenile court cases were as well informed on child psychology and modem rehabilitative techniques as Judge Polier, and as gifted
too in insight and understanding, the juvenile court would really begin to
realize some of its possibilities. A few more judges like the author would
also, because of their influential position, help to give needed impetus to the
movement to bring the other child-caring agencies up to modem standards.
But this is not supposed to be a review of the author, rather of her product.
The book may be described succinctly as an exposition of the point of view
of the trained child welfare worker for a non-professional (that is to say
non-social-worker) audience. It is also an appraisal of this point of view
through the eyes of a public official who has responsibilities to the commonwealth as well as to some of its underprivileged minors. A mature blending
of the two not-so-very-different philosophies emerges and is made concrete
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through detailed analysis of the way in which the courts and the child-caring
agencies now function and the way they might function' under more enlightened leadership. In a chapter entitled "Welfare's Roulette Wheel" the confusing and inconsistent pattern in New York City receives special treatment
and the work of the children's courts and probation services, the privately
operated (and often denominational) detention home and placement agencies,
and the State Board of Welfare are all evaluated criti ally. Judge Polier
doubts whether the inspections and reports made of the children's agencies
by the State Board's representatives "have made any substantial contribution toward improving the program for children or the personnel which
administers it." Blame for the situation is placed in part on the denominational and sectarian agencies themselves who have interposed strenuous
resistance to any effective state control.
The book contains chapters summarizing the history of child care in
America and in England which help to explain some of the anomalies and
lags in our present set-up. More important perhaps are the innumerable
case anecdotes with which the entire exposition is interlarded. They give
moving force to the suggestions for improving the present institutional arrangements and at the same time illustrate the wisdom and the insight with
which a really well-trained judge approaches juvenile problems.
There were a number of good books on the child welfare movement
already available, and doubtless some of them are more suitable for the professional than this one. But in the reviewer's opinion Judge Polier has
written the best non-technical introduction on the market. It should be a
primer for lawyers who ever expect to handle family or children's court cases
as also for any citizen whose interest and sense of responsibility extends to
the quarter of the "next generation" who are underprivileged.
J. L. Woadsuard*
Ithaca, New York

Handbook of the Law of Torts. By WILLIAM
West Publishing Co. 1941. Pp. xiii, 1309.

L.

PROSSER.

St. Paul:

An adequate review of this book might be condensed into the time-worn
maxim: "A good wine needs no bush." But to stop here would be to play
traitor to the reviewers' craft. By custom a reviewer normally will do one
of two things. First, he may essay a demonstration of his own erudition and
try to prove that he is a better man than the author by a meticulous dissection of the book under review. Or, a mere variant of this technique, he
may, while admitting that he is at the moment only one of. the lesser lights,
attempt to show promise that he will later develop into one of the greater
luminaries by picking multitudinous minor flaws in the work of a greater
man. Or, secondly, he may swing to the other extreme and write his review
in honeyed and saccharine phrases. This is usually a safe procedure, though
by it one does not earn a reputation for erudition. Indeed, if the book is
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really good and is widely acclaimed, he may do no more than establish the
conviction that he merely waits for the band-wagon to start and then climbs
aboard for a free ride. Of course, there are intermediate methods. One may
give merely a colorless description of the work, not venturing to evaluate
it, or one may avoid trouble by refusing to go beyond the introduction and
table of contents. In this instance I am joining the scramble of those
attempting to mount the band-wagon, but it happens that I bring my own
horn.
In this book we have further unassailable proof that the name "Hornbook"
as applied to this series of texts has been completely outgrown. This is
definitely a hand-book which has value for student and practitioner alike,
and even the professors may be excused if now and then they turn to it. It
is a triumph of condensation and intelligent selection. Its footnotes have
been prepared with care and with notable judgment. The statements in its
text are clear and readable. They demonstrate that learning is not necessarily
accompanied by dullness. The book has now been long enough in print to
have received the acid test of student use. There is uniform testimony that
students have found it good. The practicing lawyer will find in it that balanced presentation of ideas which can come only from years of active practice siuch as the author enjoyed. The professor will find it the product of
painstaking scholarship. He may possibly disagree with some of the ideas
or theories expressed, but he can never complain that these were offered
without adequate foundation or mature thought. He will find no dogmatic
assertions about debatable points. One must go far to find equally satisfactory presentations of the problems of negligence, of mental disturbance, of
defamation. Nor is the underlying philosophy of the fields ignored. True, it
is at times rather skilfully suppressed, or perhaps even sugarcoated to make
it more palatable. (Such a technique may be necessary until one's readers
have developed a taste for this sort of thing, and this book was written for
large use by beginners in law.)
It is no criticism to say that if I were writing such a book I would arrange
the materials somewhat differently. Arrangement is at best largely an
arbitrary matter. Often it is no more than a matter of personal preference.
The only important thing is that the arrangement and the accompanying
index shall render the material of the book readily accessible. That has been
done, and the various discussions have been adequately and satisfactorily
tied in with the provisions of the Restatement of Torts.
Three reasons explain the greatly increased bulk of the book: (1) The
field of Torts has grown tremendously. No other branch of law has undergone such rapid and extensive change, expansion and development. (2) As
indicated above this is a short treatise, not a skeletonized presentation of
the bare bones of the subject. (3) The new format, adopted by the West
Company, employs larger type and greater spacing, particularly of the notes,
but legibility is gained thereby. This accounts for the 1127 pages of text
and the 182 pages devoted to the index and the table of cases.
So I come "out by the same door where in I went." Nothing that I can
say will add to the luster of this book; nothing detract from the welcome it
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justly merits. I like it. It is, I believe, the best short text on Torts now in
print. It is a better book than I could have written.
Lyman P. Wilson*
Ithaca, N. Y.
New York Criminal Law.
GOFFEN.

By
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New York: Harmon Publications.
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1941.

and WILLIAM

Pp. xlvii, 976.

Joab H. Banton, a former district attorney of New York County concludes
his foreword to Schwartz and Goffen's New York Criminal Law with the
following:
"I most heartily recommend the volume to law students, peace officers
and others having to do with the administration of the criminal lawwardens, prison keepers, court attaches, probation and parole officers
and, particularly, to my many friends in the New York Police Department. Moreover, it may be consulted with profit by members of
the bar."
The main sources of profit for the lawyer will probably be found in the
New York Penal Law, which is set out in full and covers the second half of
the book, and also in that portion of the text which repeats the Penal Law
sections relating to some two dozen crimes and supplements this with
the facts or the ruling in most of the New York decisions construing these
sections. Additional profit may be gleaned from 150 odd pages devoted to
Arrest, Bail, Arraignment, Pleadings, Venue, Jurisdiction, Extradition,
Criminal Evidence and Double Jeopardy.
Although a standard annotation of the Penal Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure should yield as great a return, the authors do go well beyond
the decided cases in discussing each subject. In practically every chapter
they state the law on many points not yet settled by the New York cdurts.
But this is done ex cathedrawithout reference to the authorities and without
revealing the reasoning that led the authors to a particular conclusion. Here
is a typical paragraph:
"The term 'burning' means that there must be some consuming of the
material of which the building is constructed. If there is merely a
scorching or blackening, it is only attempted arson. Thus, if an inflammable liquid is spread upon a carpeted stairway and lighted, unless the
stairway itself is burned, not merely scorched or blackened, it is attempted arson. However, if the fibre of the wood is destroyed, although
there is no blaze, then the full crime is committed."'
The book apparently was intended for prospective members of the
New York Police Department, many of whom train for their profession at a
school conducted by one of the authors. The law of arrest is allotted as
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much space as the law of homicide, and the criminal evidence chapter seems
to have been put together with an eye toward the neophyte policeman as
the reader.
It is interesting to note that after quoting Civil Practice Act, Sec. 374-a,
which deals with the admissibility of books, the authors conceal from the
police the disheartening news that not even that section renders their reports
admissible. 2
Mr. Banton is warranted in recommending the book to wardens, prison
keepers, court attaches, probation and parole officers, but it should be said
that no part of the Correction Law is discussed and there is no treatment
of any probation or parole problems.
Syracuse, N. Y.
Victor Levine*
.2fohnson v. Lutz, 253 N. Y. 124.
*Professor of Law, Syracuse University.

